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INTERSTATE FEDERALISM: EFFECT OF FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT TO JUDGMENTS
Jean A. Mortland*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federalism usually is considered in the context of state-federal relations.' Few writers address relations between and among states,
which also is an important aspect of federalism. This article takes up
the neglected topic of interstate federalism by analyzing the effect of
the full faith and credit clause upon enforcement of foreign judgments
and upon relationships between and among states.
The development of the application of the full faith and credit
clause to enforce judgments is considered in Part II which discusses the
basic principle that a judgment must be recognized and enforced by
every state, even where the public policy of the enforcing state is violated. The article then describes three exceptions to the basic
rule-first, that questions as to the title of land are determined by
courts of the situs which may reject a foreign state determination; second, that the enforcing state may bar enforcement of a foreign judgment by its statute of limitations; and, third, that the enforceability of
a probate decree depends on presence of property, or of a locally appointed personal representative, in the rendering state. Part II concludes by describing those areas that remain uncertain: the enforceability under the full faith and credit clause of modifiable decrees, custody
decrees, injunctions against foreign suits, and penalty judgments, and
the collateral estoppel effect of a foreign judgment.
Part III considers the purpose of the full faith and credit clause by
focusing on three cases dealing with the res judicata effect of workers'
compensation awards. 2 The discussion reflects two views as to the purpose of the full faith and credit clause-to give deference to the rendering state or to achieve finality by nationalizing res judicata-and concludes that there is uncertainty as to which is primary.
*
Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; LL.M., New York University 1969;
J.D., Capital University 1964; B.S., Ohio State University 1952.
1. See Brandes, When Constitutions Collide: A Study in Federalism in the Criminal Law
Context, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 55 (1988); Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 345 (1990); Pannier, Justifying Federalism, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 613 (1990); Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
335 (1990); White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14 NOVA L. REv. 155 (1989).
2. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
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Part IV concludes that even though a money judgment clearly is
enforceable, enforcement of a foreign judgment is not required in cases
involving title to land and where statutes of limitations conflict. There
also are instances where the desirability of enforcement is an open
question. The most recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
indicates the lack of a clear conceptualization of the purpose of the
clause.3 The conclusion of Part IV is that nationalizing res judicata is
paramount.

II.

APPLICATIONS OF THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution
provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.""
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the drafters of the Constitution adopted the clause nearly verbatim from the Articles of Confederation.' At the time of the drafting of the Articles of Confederation in
1777, the thirteen states wanted to retain their independence and sovereignty while still fulfilling their obligations to their sister states.6 The
states were well aware that failure to recognize the acts of their sister
states would not further the life of the confederation.' Further, the
drafters of the Articles may have been aware of the English common
law practice of enforcing certain foreign judgments.' Justice Story later
speculated that the purpose of the full faith and credit clause was "to
give each State a higher security and confidence in the others, by attributing a superior sanctity and conclusiveness to the public acts and
judicial proceedings of all." 9 The history of the interpretation of the
reach of the full faith and credit clause reflects, however, considerable
confusion over the extent to which the judgment of a sister state truly
is enforceable.
A.

Limitation on the Right to Reject a Foreign Judgment
No outside power can require a sovereign nation to recognize or

3. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 261.
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1945).
6. Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 3 (1944).
7. Sumner, The Full-Faith-And-Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV.
224, 229 (1955).
8. Id.
9. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 190 (5th ed.
1891).
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enforce the judgment of another nation. 10 There is, however, a generally followed principle of comity by which nations recognize many foreign judgments." Does this same principle of comity apply to states
within a nation? In particular, to what extent does the full faith and
credit clause require a state to enforce a judgment rendered in a sister
state?
Early cases reflected conflicting decisions with several holding that
a judgment from another state was only prima facie evidence of a
debt. 12 The first decision by the Supreme Court, however, held that the
sister state judgment has conclusive effect."
The act declares that the record duly authenticated shall have such faith
and credit as it has in the state Court from whence it is taken. If in such
Court it has the faith and credit of evidence of the highest nature, viz.
record evidence, it must have the same faith and credit in every other
Court ....

Were the construction contended for by the Plaintiff in error to prevail, that judgments of the state Courts ought to be considered prima
facie evidence only, this clause in the constitution would be utterly unimportant and illusory. The common law would give such judgments precisely the same effect. It is manifest however that the constitution contemplated a power in congress to give a conclusive effect to such
judgments. And we can perceive no rational interpretation of the act of
congress, unless it declares a judgment conclusive when a Court of the
particular state where it is rendered would pronounce the same
decision. 1 '
Later cases held that, while the enforcing state may not retry the merits of a judgment rendered in another state, it may require an action to
reduce the foreign judgment to a domestic judgment,' 5 and it may bar
enforcement by applying a statute of limitations different from that of
the rendering state.' 6
The opinions in Fauntleroy v. Lum," upon which most contemporary full faith and credit jurisprudence is based, make it apparent that,

10. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Miller v. Hall, 1 DalI. 229, 232 (Pa. 1788).
11. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164; see id. at 166-69 (discussing the various situations in which
courts will recognize foreign judgments).
12. Nadelman, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33,
62-69 (1957). There is little in the records of the Constitutional Convention or ratification to
indicate the intent of the framers. However, Nadelman finds evidence in statutes of some of the
colonies to support an intent of national res judicata. Id. at 34-53.
13. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
14. Id. at 484-85.
15. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
16. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866).
17. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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despite the early cases, the notion of full faith and credit was not well
established in the early part of the twentieth century. In Fauntleroy, a
Missouri court had rendered a judgment on a futures contract entered
into in Mississippi between two Mississippi residents, despite the fact
that the contract was criminal and unenforceable in Mississippi. 18 The
Mississippi courts denied enforcement on the grounds that the underlying acts were against the public policy of Mississippi and that its courts
were powerless to enforce the contract. 1 The United States Supreme
Court reversed.2 0
The Court held that the judgment, conclusive in Missouri, was
conclusive also in Mississippi under the full faith and credit clause.2
Because Mississippi courts had the power to enforce plaintiff's action in
debt, they were not permitted to inquire into the merits of the judgment. 2 The dissent, joined by three justices, took the position that the
full faith and credit clause "was not to confer any new power, but simply to make obligatory that duty which, when the Constitution was
adopted rested . . . in comity alone." 23 Under the rules of comity:
[N]o sovereignty was or is under the slightest moral obligation to give
effect to a judgment of a court of another sovereignty, when to do so
would compel the State in which the judgment was sought to be executed to enforce an illegal and prohibited contract, when both the contract and all the acts done in connection with its performance had taken
place in the latter State.2 '
The Missouri court, by rendering judgment on the futures contract, almost certainly had denied full faith and credit to Mississippi
law, probably due to a mistaken belief that the arbitration was binding
under Mississippi law. 25 The case should have been decided on the basis of Mississippi law because Missouri's only connection with the case
was as the forum.2 6 The Court, by requiring enforcement even of a
18.

Id. at 233-34.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 234.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 237.
See id. at 238.

23. Id. at 242 (White, J., dissenting)
24. Id. at 241 (White, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id. at 238.

26. Full faith and credit in choice of law is a subject for another article, but at the time
Faunteroy was decided, the general choice of law rule for contracts was that a contract is controlled by the law of the place where the contract is made. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 332 (1934). In 1918, ten years after Faunderoy, the Court held that a state could not
apply its own law to a contract made in another state. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S.
357 (1918). This seemed to enshrine place.of the contract as a constitutional requirement, but a
few years later, in a case with very similar facts, the Court distinguished Dodge, indicating retreat. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922). Twenty-two years after Fauntleroy,
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judgment granted in violation of the enforcing state's law, has national-

ized res judicata. A person has one opportunity to litigate an issue, and
then is bound by the result in all states. The effect is to limit the sover-

eignty of the enforcing state while enhancing the sovereignty of the
rendering state.
The rule of Fauntleroy was restated, this time in an 8-0 decision,
in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co. 2 7 In a battle over ownership of mining stock, actions were brought in both Idaho and Washington. The

Washington court, in administering the estate, reached a decision first
and ruled that the property belonged to the petitioner.2 Its decision
included a finding that it had exclusive jurisdiction because the dispute

arose in a probate proceeding.

9

The Idaho trial court's decree for re-

appealed."0

The Idaho Supreme Court remanded and the
spondent was
trial court entered a final decree for the respondent.3 1 A petition for
certiorari from the Idaho Supreme Court decision was denied; no review of the second trial court decision was sought.3 2 The defendant
then filed another suit in Washington, alleging the invalidity of the

Idaho decree.33 The mining company filed an interpleader in the federal district court in Idaho. 4 The federal 3courts, culminating with the
Supreme Court, upheld the Idaho decree. 5
The United States Supreme Court held that the Idaho court properly considered the effect of the Washington decree and that the Idaho
decision to deny full faith and credit also was proper because the
Washington court had no further jurisdiction after a decree of distribution. 6 It was proper for the Idaho court to consider whether the Wash-

the Supreme Court held that the due process clause prevents a state from applying its own law
where it has no contacts with the transaction other than being the forum. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930) (full faith and credit was not an issue because the foreign state was Mexico).
In 1939 the Court explicitly held that an interested state may use its own law even though the law
of another state purports to control the transaction. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (employment relationship in a workers compensation context).
Nevertheless, the Court has never allowed a state to use its own law when its only contact with the
case is as the forum.
27. 308 U.S. 66 (1939). This is the leading case. Other cases, before and after Treinies,
have held the same way. See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins., 455 U.S. 691 (1982); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Suttor v. Leib,
343 U.S. 402 (1952); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U.S. 559 (1886).
28. Treinies, 308 U.S. at 68.
29. Id. at 69-70.
30. Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (1936).
31. Treinies, 308 U.S. at 69.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 70.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 76-78.
36. Id. at 78.
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ington court had jurisdiction and the parties were free to seek review of
the Idaho trial court's decision in an Idaho appellate court. 7 The Idaho
court decided the controlling issue-that the Washington decree was
not entitled to full faith and credit-and its decision was entitled to full
faith and credit.3 8
The rule set forth in Treinies has not always been followed by
state courts, particularly when the law of the enforcing state is at odds
with that of the rendering state.3 9 The enforcing state's reluctance to
recognize a judgment sometimes is based on the belief that the rendering court failed to consider the judgments of the court from which it
now seeks cooperation. The Supreme Court of Arizona has said, "[w]e
note that appellants do not ask us to merely give full faith and credit to
the Idaho judgment. Instead, we are asked to give it greater credit than
the prior Arizona judgments. We do not think the full faith and credit
clause requires such a conclusion."4 This posture misses the fact that
the second court was, or would have been had the parties raised the
issue, the only court considering the matter of full faith and credit to
the first judgment. If there is ever to be finality, the holding on that
issue must be given full faith and credit.
Professor Ginsburg suggests that the first court should not be required to adhere to the second judgment when the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari to the second judgment.4 ' She reasons that the unsuccessful party has fully satisfied the federal policy behind requiring diligent pursuit of a claim for recognition of the first judgment.4 Ginsburg's position, however, fails to give proper recognition to the need to
put an end to litigation. A denial of certiorari has the effect of depriving the second judgment of finality.
B.

Exceptions

It is noteworthy that most of the exceptions to literal application
of the full faith and credit clause arise in cases where the relief sought
is non-monetary or where money judgments are affected only collaterally. Full faith and credit to money judgments can be given only by
enforcing them, and the "same full faith and credit . . . as they have
by law or usage in the courts . . . from which they are taken"' 3 clearly

37. Id. at 77-78.
38. Id. at 76.
39. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for
Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 798, 811-19 (1969).
40. Porter v. Porter, 101 Ariz. 131, 135, 416 P.2d 564, 568 (1966).
41. Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 803-06.
42. Id.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1987).
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requires enforcement. There is less certainty as to what full faith and
credit requires with respect to other types of relief.
1. Title to Land
The major exception to the full faith and credit rule arises from
decisions that purport to affect title to land. The Supreme Court has
not deemed the clause inapplicable, but rather has held that only the
state where the land is located has jurisdiction to determine title. As a
result, any decree from another state, rendered without jurisdiction, is
void." Three cases set forth the contours of the title to land exception
of the full faith and credit clause.
Clarke v. Clarke'5 concerned Connecticut land owned by a woman
living in South Carolina before her death; her estate was being administered in South Carolina."' Her will gave her property to her husband
and two daughters.'7 The problem arose when one daughter died before
the estate was distributed. 8 The South Carolina court held that the
will worked an equitable conversion because it indicated an intent to
sell the realty and distribute the proceeds. 4'9 The court thereupon ordered distribution of the deceased daughter's share under the law of
South Carolina to her father and sister equally. 50 When the father
sought that distribution in Connecticut, the Connecticut court refused
to accept the South Carolina decision and ordered distribution to the
sister alone under Connecticut law. 51
The Supreme Court affirmed the Connecticut decision, holding
that South Carolina had no power to determine title to Connecticut
land.5 2 The courts of South Carolina could construe the decedent's will
as it applied to South Carolina property, but if the Connecticut property was real estate it was not amenable to South Carolina jurisdiction.5 s The South Carolina court could not even bind the parties. Because the living sister was a minor, represented by a guardian ad
litem" who did not have authority outside South Carolina, her interests

44.

Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).

45.
46.
47.

178 U.S. 186 (1900).
Id. at 187. The decedent owned property in South Carolina and Connecticut.
id.

48.

Id.

Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 193.
A guardian ad litem is a "special guardian appointed by the court in which a particular
is pending to represent an infant, ward, or unborn person in that particular litigation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
litigation
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in Connecticut land could not be represented.55
Fall v. Eastin" reasserted the holding of Clarke in the context of
a divorce. The divorce was granted in Washington and the husband,
owner of land in Nebraska, was ordered to convey the land to the wife.
He failed to do so and the court appointed a commissioner, who executed the deed on the husband's behalf.57 The husband then transferred
the land to a third party." The wife brought an action to quiet title in
Nebraska, alleging that she owned the land by the commissioner's deed
and that the transferee knew of the commissioner's deed and so was not
a good faith purchaser." The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Nebraska courts which held that the commissioner's deed had no
effect.60

The Court rejected the wife's argument that Fauntleroy, which
had been decided since Clarke, required Nebraska to give full faith
and credit to the Washington decree and deed. 1 "[H]owever plausibly
the contrary view may be sustained, we think that the doctrine that the
court, not having jurisdiction of the res, cannot affect it by its decree,
nor by a deed made by a master in accordance with the decree, is
firmly established." 6 The Court recognized that a deed executed by
the husband would have been effective even though under compulsion
of the decree, but found the master's deed ineffective."
55. Clarke, 178 U.S. at 193. The Court has never directly addressed the question whether
such a decree binds parties who are sui juris. In Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909), while holding
that a commissioner's deed to Nebraska land was executed without jurisdiction over the land, the
Court recognized that the rendering court had jurisdiction to order a conveyance. Id. at 14. In
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942), the Court stated: "So far as the assets in
Georgia are concerned, the Georgia judgment of probate is in rem; so far as it affects personalty
beyond the state, it is in personam .
I..."
Id. at 353 (emphasis added). The statement implies
that a court cannot bind even the parties as to title to realty, but the case dealt with stock, so the
Court was not thinking about the problems of realty. There seems to be no good reason to allow
persons who had a full opportunity to litigate the issue a second chance elsewhere, but this issue is
not resolved in the state courts, as will be shown below.
56. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 6, 14.
61. Id. at 10. Justice Harlan and Justice Brewer dissented without opinion. Justice Holmes
concurred on the ground that the Nebraska court held only that the decree could not affect the
conscience of the purchaser; he did not see a constitutional issue in that holding. Id. at 14-15
(Holmes, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 14. The Fall plaintiff's choice of remedy may have affected the decision. The
Court stated that "[p]laintiff seems to contend for a greater efficacy for a decree in equity affecting real property than is given to a judgment at law for the recovery of money simply." Id. at 12.
The reference would be to the requirement of a suit to domesticate a foreign judgment. The
plaintiff, in her quiet title action, was asking for direct enforcement of the commissioner's deed.
Id. at 3-4; See generally Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U.
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The Supreme Court's most recent land case involving full faith
and credit is Durfee v. Duke." The issue before the Court was title to
land on the Missouri River which depended on whether a shift in the
river's course was caused by avulsion or accretion." The answer to that
question determined whether the land was located in Nebraska, where
the action was brought initially, or in Missouri, where the losing party
brought a second action. The Court held that the Nebraska decision-that the shift was by avulsion and the land was in Nebraska-was entitled to full faith and credit. 66 The question of jurisdiction over7 the land was fully litigated and the decision binding on the
6
parties.
Durfee is peculiar in that the determination of the location of the
land and, thus, jurisdiction, was based upon the same facts that decided
the substantive question of title. If the jurisdictional decision was not
entitled to full faith and credit, no state court could make a final decision in the case because the jurisdictional question always would be
open to challenge on the factual question of location of the land. The
Court, however, stated that "[t] he Nebraska court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the controversy only if the land in question was in
Nebraska.""8
State court decisions are not uniform on the question of title to
land. The courts seem to agree that, while no state has direct power to
affect title to land in another state, a court may bind the parties by an
equitable decree ordering conveyance of land in another state." There
is considerably less agreement about the effect of a decree that purports to affect title directly and does not order any action. Some courts
hold that since the foreign court had no jurisdiction over the land, any
70
findings are made without jurisdiction and have no binding effect.
Other courts will bind those who are parties to the foreign action by
the findings of fact and the holdings as to their rights and duties as to
each other.7 1
Reflective of disparate approaches is Rozan v. Rozan7 2 which be-

REy. 620 (1954).
64. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
65. Id. at 107-08.
66. id. at 109.
67. Id. at 109.
68. Id. at 107-08.
69. See Annotation, Res Judicata or CollateralEstoppel Effect, in State Where Real Property Is Located, of Foreign Decree Dealing with Such Property, 32 A.L.R.3d 1330, §§ 3-4
(1970).
70. Id. § 3.
71. Id. §4.
72. 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); partiallyenforced, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964).
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gan as a divorce action in California. The court decided- that North
Dakota realty owned by the husband was acquired with community
funds and thus was community property. 8 The court further decided
that the wife was entitled to sixty-five percent of the property, which
had been transferred fraudulently by the husband to his nephew."4 The
Supreme Court of California affirmed the decision, but modified the
decree to make clear that California was not purporting to affect title
to North Dakota land.7 5 The original decree which awarded sixty-five
percent of the property to the wife as her separate property was modified by the supreme court to state that:
[E]ach and every one of the . . . North Dakota properties . . . were
acquired with community property funds of plaintiff and Rozan; . . .
that plaintiff is entitled to 65% of the aforementioned properties and of
the rents, issues and profits thereof as against Rozan; that Rozan is entitled to 35 % of the aforementioned properties and of the rents, issues and
profits thereof as against plaintiff .... 76
The court also stated that the nephew, who was not a party, could not
be bound by the judgment.7
When the wife sued in North Dakota to enforce the California
decree, the North Dakota court recognized the judgment to the extent
that it found that the property was acquired with community funds,
but refused to enforce that part of the judgment entitling the wife to
sixty-five percent.7 8 Since the California decree did not order the husband to convey his interest,7 9 recognition of the finding as res judicata
would be an acknowledgment of jurisdiction in the courts of another
state to directly affect the title to North Dakota real property.8 0 Therefore, the finding that the conveyance was fraudulent was not res judicata but should be tried by the law of North Dakia. 81
Rozan creates uncertainty because the California court's careful
attempt to assure that its decree would not be taken as an attempt to
directly affect title to North Dakota land was ignored by the North
Dakota court. While a trial would be required to give the nephew an
opportunity to prove that he was a good faith purchaser, there is no
reason to give the husband an opportunity to relitigate the issue of title.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
'79.
80.
81.

Id. at 327, 317 P.2d at 14.
Id. at 328, 317 P.2d at 14.
Id. at 332, 317 P.2d at 16.
Id. at 332, 317 P.2d at 17.
Id. at 331, 317 P.2d at 16. o
Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694, 701 (N.D. 1964).
Id. Of course, he could not be ordered to convey because he no longer held title.
Id.
Id. at 706.
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The husband had an opportunity to prove he did not act fraudulently;
his nephew did not. If other courts follow the lead of North Dakota, it
will be difficult to fashion a decree involving title to foreign realty to
avoid relitigation.
An earlier North Dakota case, while distinguishable, takes a more
constructive approach. In re Reynolds' Will 8 2 dealt with North Dakota
land held in a California testamentary trust. 88 The estate, including the
land, was given in trust for the testator's son for his life, then twothirds to his issue and one-third to a North Dakota charity, or if, as it
happened, the son died without issue, all to the charity." The California probate court, at the time of the testator's death, had ordered distribution to the trust with the two-thirds remainder to be distributed to
those named in the son's will if he died without issue. 85 The two-thirds
to the charity was void under the California mortmain statute.8 6 The
charity was not a party to the probate proceeding. When the son died,
the trustee filed accountings in the California court. The charity, a
party to the accountings, accepted and gave receipts for one-third of
the California assets before claiming all of the North Dakota realty
under the terms of the will.87 In a suit filed in North Dakota, the charity argued that the validity of the will as to North Dakota land was
controlled by the law of North Dakota, which did not invalidate the
gift. 88 The North Dakota court, holding that the charity was limited to
one-third, did not vest the California court with jurisdiction to determine the validity of the will as to North Dakota land. Instead, it held
that the charity was estopped to claim all of the land, reasoning that if
the charity had made the claim early, its share of the land would have
been set off against, its share in the California assets, entitling it only to
one-third of the total estate.8 9 Waiting to make its claim until it had
accepted its shareof the California assets made that distribution impossible and estopped it from claiming more than one-third of the
land."' Perhaps because the charity was a party to the California accounting and had accepted benefits, the court in Reynolds, contrary to
the approach it later adopted in Rozan, separated the issue of direct
effect on title from the issue of rights between the parties.
A case more representative of state approaches is In re Estate of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

85 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1957).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
Id.
Id. at 557-58.
Id.
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Mack, 91 which also arose from a divorce action. The court in Missouri
awarded to the wife joint tenancy property located in Iowa.92 The decree did not order the husband to convey his interest and he had not
done so when the wife, since remarried, died." The former husband
sought title to the land, asserting that because the Missouri decree was
ineffective to transfer his interest, title was still in joint tenancy at his
former wife's death and the property was entirely his as the survivor."
The Iowa court rejected his argument.9
The court acknowledged that some courts recognize the validity of
decrees ordering the conveyance of land and refuse to recognize a foreign decree that purports to transfer the title without an order." The
court stated that the better reasoned opinions, however, have recognized the decree whenever the foreign court had personal jurisdiction
over the parties and adjudicated their rights and responsibilities in regard to the res.97 "A contrary thesis can only be justified on the ground
that granting recognition to the foreign adjudication would violate
some fundamental policy of the state where the land is located."9 8 The
court, having previously recognized an exception with respect to devolution of title on death, found no reason to refuse recognition of the
land provisions of a foreign divorce decree. 9" Even though its decision
was based upon principles of comity, the Mack court recognized that
the full faith and credit clause might require the same result.10 0
2.

Statutes of Limitations

Another important exception to the rule of full faith and credit
allows the enforcing state to apply its own statute of limitations to bar
an enforcement action even though the judgment is still enforceable in
the rendering state."' This result seems contrary to the language of the

91. 373 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1985).
92. Id. at 98. The decree specifically provided: "The Court sets off to the petitioner ... the
farm located in Cedar County, Iowa . . .to be the petitioner's separate property .
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 100.
96. Id. at 99.
97. Id. at 99-100.
98. Id. at 100.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court discussed other state court cases holding that, regardless of the form of
the decree, the rendering court had decided the rights and obligations of the parties before it and
that decision was entitled to full faith and credit. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 109 Misc. 2d 982,
984, 441 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (1981); Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal. 2d 244, 247, 331 P.2d 628, 630-31.
(1958).
101. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966); Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38
(1949); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 312 (1839). Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Lamb, stated that the reverse is also true, i.e.,
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full faith and credit implementing statute which provides that judicial
proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State . . . from which they are taken." 102
Watkins v. Conway"" is particularly bothersome, because it allows
a state to bar a sister state's judgment by applying a limitation shorter
than that for a domestic judgment. The United States Supreme Court
in Watkins rejected an equal protection argument, reasoning that a revival of the Florida judgment would start the clock running on the
Georgia limitation.1 0 The Court stated that "[i]f the appellant held a
judgment from a State which did not consider its judgments to become
dormant, so that no revival proceeding could be brought, we would be
faced with a different case." 105 However, the Florida statute of limitations was longer than the Georgia statute and the judgment had not yet
become dormant in Florida.1 6 The Court did not consider whether
Florida would revive a judgment before it became dormant.
The Supreme Court, in Union National Bank v. Lamb,10 7 held
that, when a judgment has been revived in the rendering state, the enforcing state must use the new date if the revival has the effect of creating a new judgment. The Court stated, however, that the enforcing
state may use the original date if the revival has the effect of simply
extending the statute of limitation on the original judgment.10 8 Determining the effect on the statute of a revival is not always easy. The

the enforcing state may recognize the judgment even though it is barred in the rendering state.
337 U.S. at 46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928)).
However, Roche does not support Justice Frankfurter's statement. In Roche, the plaintiff sued in
Oregon to enforce a'Whshington judgment that was barred in Washington. The defendant demurred and then defaulted after the demurrer was denied. Thus the issue of enforceability was not
raised in Oregon. The Court held that it could not be raised in Washington and that a state
cannot refuse recognition to a foreign judgment because it fails to apply properly the law of the
state in which recognition is sought. Roche. 275 U.S. at 452 (citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S.
230, 236 (1908)). The defendant should have raised the Washington statute of limitations in the
Oregon action.
Justice Frankfurter's statement in Lamb raises a different issue. When a state denies recognition to a judgment still enforceable in the rendering state, the question is whether it is denying the
plaintiff the relief he obtained in another state and, if so, whether that denial is justified by the
forum's view of judicial economy. When a court enforces a judgment barred in the other state, the
question is whether it may give the judgment greater effect than it has in the state where rendered. See infra notes 222-38 and accompanying text.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1987).
103. 385 U.S. 188 (1966) (per curiam).
104. Id. at 189-90.
105. Id. at 191 n.4.
106. Id. at 190 n.2.
107. 337 U.S. 38 (1949).
108. Id. at 43-44; see also supra note 101 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Lamb).
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statute in Lamb, for example, was less than clear on this issue. The
majority quoted one provision: "'A revived judgment must be entered
within 20 years after the entry of the judgment which it revives, and
may be enforced and made a lien in the same manner and for like
period as an original judgment.' "109 The majority also cited a Colorado
case holding that a revived judgment has the effect of a new one. 110
Justice Frankfurter quoted a different provision of the statute:
"'[F]rom and after twenty years from the entry of final judgment in
any court of this state, the same shall be Considered as satisfied in full,
unless revived as provided by law.' "111 Justice Frankfurter construed
this provision as an extension of the statute of limitation on the old
judgment.1 1 2 The distinction between a new judgment and a revived
judgment seems to make the cases rhore complicated without serving
any discernable policy purpose. Whether the judgment is enforceable in
the rendering state is a much simpler question to answer. The opinion
in Watkins, requiring only, revival of the foreign judgment, could lead
one to conclude that the distinction is no longer controlling, but it is not
a holding and state courts have not interpreted it that way.
An examination of some state court cases illustrates the complications that arise when courts attempt to distinguish between new and
revived judgments. Carter v. Carter"3 considered application of the
Virginia statute of limitation to a judgment for child support issued by
a Florida court in 1964-and revived in 1977. Virginia law allows twenty
years to enforce a judgment and ten years to bring an action to domesticate a foreign judgment." 4 This child support enforcement action was
brought in 1981.116 The court found, without any citation to authority,
that under Florida law the relevant date was the date of the original
judgment, thus barring the action. 1 ' The apparent result is that the
date of revival is meaningless. The court rejected the argument that the
Virginia statute discriminates against foreign judgments in violation of
the equal protection clause, reasoning that holders of domestic judgments and holders of foreign judgments are not similarly situated, thus
negating the requirement of equal treatment.
The Carter court's assertion that the equal protection clause is not
violated is untenable. A domesticated judgment is treated as a Virginia

109. Id. at 44 n.11 (quoting I CoLo. STAT. ANN., ch. 6, Rule 54(h) (1935)).
110. Id. at 44 (citing La Fitte v. Salisbury, 43 Colo. 248, 95 P. 1065 (1908)).
111. Id. at 47 n.2 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 CoLo. STAT. ANN., ch. 93, § 2

(1935)).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
232 Va. 166, 349 S.E.2d 95 (1986).
2 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-251,-252 (1990).
232 VA. at 169, 349 S.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 170, 349 S.E.2d at 97.
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judgment. The foreign creditor thus has twenty years from the date of
domestication to bring an action to enforce the judgment, a longer period of time than that afforded to the domestic creditor." 7 The purpose
of the ten year limit was to protect defendants from stale claims and
give them the opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.118 Regardless of its purpose, the effect of the ten year statute is
to discriminate against the foreign judgment.11 9 Reliance on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Conway is inappropriate
here because, unlike the Georgia statute which measures from the date
from the date of the
of latest revival,12 0 the Virginia statute measured
121
discriminatory.
is
so
and
judgment
original
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Riggs12 involved an action

on a 1977 Colorado judgment registered in Oklahoma in the same
year. No writ of execution was ever issued in Oklahoma.12 The creditor refiled the judgment in 1982, more than five years after it was rendered in Colorado.12 4 Oklahoma law makes a judgment*dormant unless
execution is issued within five years after it is rendered; it does not
provide for revival. 125 The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, as enacted in Oklahoma, provides that "[a] judgment so filed has
the same effect . . . as a judgment [of Oklahoma] . . . and may be

enforced or satisfied in like manner.1 126 The court held that the combination of the dormancy statute and the Uniform Act requires a domesticated judgment to be treated as an Oklahoma judgment and that, to
prevent dormancy, an execution must issue within five years of the rendition, not registration, of the judgment.12 7 The effect of this holding is
to prevent the judgment creditor who learns too late about debtorowned property in Oklahoma from enforcing the judgment against that
property unless the judgment' can be revived and take on the effect of a

117. Id. at 171-72, 349 S.E.2d at 97-98.
118. Id. at 173, 349 S.E.2d at 99.
119. Id. at 175, 349 S.E.2d at 100 (Russell, J. dissenting).
120. Conway, 385 U.S. at 189; 6 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-20 (Supp. 1990).
121. Carter. 232 Va. at 173, 349 S.E.2d at 100 (Russell, J. dissenting); 2 VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-252 (1990).
122. 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1985).
123. Id. at 1359.
124. Id.
125. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 735 (West 1981).
126. Id. § 721 (West 1988); UNIF. ENF. FOR. JuDG. A. 13 U.L.A. 149 (1964). The act's
provision in section 2 that registration gives the judgment the same effect as a judgment of the
state of registration is contrary to the full faith and credit clause and the enabling statute, which
require the same effect as the rendering state. The act, in section 6, expressly preserves the creditor's right to enforce his judgment by an action rather than registration, so the creditor may have
taken the wrong route here.
127. 692 P.2d at 1363.
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new judgment in the rendering state. The effect also is to allow the
judgment debtor to sell concealed or after-acquired property and use
the proceeds to buy property in a state like Oklahoma where it can be
shielded from the judgment creditor.
The plaintiff in Ames v. Ames 2 ' received a divorce under California law and initiated child support proceedings in California under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act when she discovered
that her former husband was living in Florida. A judgment in her favor
was rendered in Florida in 1962.129 After making fourteen child support payments, the defendant moved to Oregon in 1966.130 In 1969, a
Florida court dismissed the case on the mistaken ground that the case
had been dismissed in California. " ' The plaintiff learned in 1976 that
the defendant was living in Oregon. She petitioned in 1979 for registration of the 1962 Florida order of support. The Oregon court held that
the 1969 dismissal had the effect of relieving the defendant of future
obligations; therefore, the 1979 reinstatement was void under Florida
law and, presumably, subject to collateral attack in Florida. " " Because
Oregon's ten year statute of limitations begins to run when each payment is due, enforcement of any payments due before 1969 would be
barred. 3 3 This plaintiff was saved, however, by the Oregon court's application of Oregon's tolling statute, which suspends the statute of limitations if the defendant flees Oregon or conceals himself in Oregon. " 4
The Oregon court held that since the defendant concealed himself in
Oregon, the statute of limitations was tolled from the time he disappeared until the plaintiff learned the location of his whereabouts in
1976. As a result, the judgment for payments due before 1969 could be
enforced. 33
In summary, the United States Supreme Court cases dealing with
the issue of use by an enforcing state of its own statute of limitations to
avoid enforcement of a foreign judgment are unsatisfactory and result
in problems in the state courts. The Court consistently states conclusions without reference to the statutory language, and avoids discussion
of the policy reasons which could justify a refusal to apply the statute
as written. While the enforcing state has a legitimate interest in keeping its courts free for current litigation, the issues in an action to en-

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

60 Or. App. 50, 652 P.2d 1280 (1982).
Id. at 52, 652 P.2d at 1282.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56, 652 P.2d at 1284.
Id. at 56-57, 652 P.2d at 1284.
Id. at 57, 652 P.2d at 1284-85.
Id. at 58, 652 P.2d at 1285.
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force a judgment usually are simple and require only modest expenditures of the enforcing court's resources. In fact, the need to deal with
the question of revival versus new judgment takes more of the court's
time than would routine enforcement. More importantly, the full faith
and credit clause and its enabling statute require judgments to be given
the same effect in enforcing states as in the rendering state.13 6 No exception is made for situations where the applicable statutes of limitations differ in length. The statute should be interpreted to require enforcement of any judgment enforceable in the rendering state.
3. Probate
The full faith and credit clause probably has been least effective in
the area of probate, where concepts of jurisdiction have narrowed its
effect. This narrowing arises in large part from the fiction of the personal representative, an artificial being who derives existence from the
appointing court and thus is limited in power to the geographical
boundaries of the appointing state. The problem created by the fiction
of the personal representative is illustrated by the reasoning of the
court in Knoop v. Anderson.1 87 In Knoop, a tort action was brought
under Iowa's long-arm statute against the administratrix of the estate
of the owner of a car that injured the plaintiff, an Iowa resident, in
Iowa. The decedent, owner of the car, was a resident of South Dakota,
where his estate was being administered.138 The Iowa court, on its own
motion, set a hearing on the question of whether it had jurisdiction over
the administratrix. It concluded that it did not, finding that an administratrix cannot be sued outside the state of appointment.13 9 Personal
service upon the administratrix while in the forum state is ineffective
because the administratrix is not in the forum state in her capacity as
administratrix." ° The Iowa court stated: "Even where a resident of one
state is appointed executor of an estate in another state, suit cannot be
brought against him in the state of his residence on a claim owing by
the decedent." 1 Even a voluntary appearance by the administratrix
does not confer jurisdiction.14 2 The Iowa court cited a South Dakota
court, saying: "'The duties of representatives are exclusive and inde136. The statute provides in part that "judicial proceedings ... (properly] authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its territories
and possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1966).
137. 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
138. Id. at 834.
139. Id. 838-52.
140.

Id. at 852.

141.
142.

Id. at 845.
Id.
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pendent within the jurisdiction of their appointments even though the
same individual is the appointed representative of an estate in two or

more states.'

"148

The problems associated with enforcement of foreign judgments
arising from probate proceedings have lessened substantially as courts
have accepted jurisdiction over actions brought both by and against
foreign personal representatives. The long-arm statutes conferring jurisdiction on the basis of the decedent's actions have been upheld by
almost all courts, 14 4 and the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) provides for
jurisdiction on that basis.14 8 Jurisdiction generally has been allowed
without benefit of a long-arm statute,1 4' but, in Feltman v. Coulter,""
the Arizona Supreme Court denied jurisdiction over a foreign personal
4
representative. In Pantano v. United Medical Laboratories, 1 the
Ninth Circuit denied a foreign personal representative the right to sue.
The concept of limited existence for a personal representative can
produce bizarre effects. In ancillary administrations, there is no privity
between the administrators, although there may be between executors.1 49 A creditor of the estate who successfully sues one administrator
may have to sue again if he needs to recover his judgment from another
administrator. Res judicata does not apply because the second administrator was not a party to the action, nor was he in privity with a
party.' 50 On the other hand, if the creditor is unsuccessful against one
administrator, he cannot sue the other. 1 If one administrator sues and

143. Id. at 852 (quoting American Sur. Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 71 S.D. 126, 129, 22
N.W.2d 429, 431 (1946)). Even though the personal representative is somewhat protected, protection comes at a cost in that the personal representative generally may not bring an action outside

the state of appointment.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 354 (1971). The

exceptions are failure of the defendant to object; possession by the personal representative of a
negotiable instrument, share certificate, or negotiable document of title that is the basis of the
claim; a finding that the suit is in the best interests of the estate and will not prejudice local
creditors; and a local law permitting the suit. The personal representative may also sue on a claim
acquired after his appointment. Id. § 355. These exceptions indicate that the real problem is not
the limited existence of the artificial person.
144. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8.24 & n.2 (1982).
145. Unif. Probate Code § 4-302, 8 U.L.A. 425 (1983).
146. See, e.g., Saporita v. Litner. 371 Mass. 607, 358 N.E.2d 809 (1976).
147. 111 Ariz. 295, 528 P.2d 821 (1974) (refusing to stay an action pending decision in an
Illinois case because the personal representative of an Arizona estate could not be bound and a
judgment against her would not be given full faith and credit).
148. 456 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying Oregon law to dismiss a wrongful death
action brought by a Nebraska special administrator).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 353 comment a (1971). This is
because executors derive their power from the deceased while the administrator has only the
power given by the law of the appointing state. Hill v. Tucker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 458 (1851).

150.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

151.

Id. § 357.
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loses, another administrator is not bound by the judgment. 152 The losing party is protected only to the extent that when one administrator
has recovered a judgment the other cannot sue.15 The foregoing results
because the losing party is an actual party to the suit, and so is bound
by any decision, while the estate is represented by multiple parties who
do not bind each other. 15" The UPC has changed these results; an adjudication in any jurisdiction is as binding over the local personal representative as if he were a party to the adjudication.1 5
The legislature of Kansas tried to cut through this maze by providing for universal, or nearly universal, administration. 15 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court of Kansas, in In re Estate of De Lano,5 7 held that
the Kansas statute was ineffective to give a local administrator power
over property located in other states.1 58 The basis for the holding was
that the situs of the property conferred jurisdiction in rem and that no
other state could have jurisdiction. 159 The result in De Lano was probably correct, because the decedent died before the effective date of the
statute.1 60 Additionally, there were parallel administrations in Kansas
and Missouri until the Kansas administrator was ordered to collect the
Missouri assets. 61 The Kansas Supreme Court correctly held that full
faith and credit was due the Missouri probate because the probate was
commenced before the Kansas court made any claim to the assets. 6' It
also held that the statute was unconstitutional. This reasoning is questionable because appointment of a universal administrator is a judicial
action and should be entitled to full faith and credit. The United States
Supreme Court never has held that the situs of personalty creates ex-

152. Id. § 353. 153. Id. § 352.
154. The reporter's notes to both sections 353 and 356 of Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws state that the rule "may lead to unjust and inconvenient results and is stated only because
of what is thought to be compelling, although comparatively ancient, authority." However, a recent case, in refusing a motion by an Indiana administrator to quash an Illinois action, stated that
"there is no privity between a decedent's domiciliary and ancillary estates, and a judgment against
the representative of one of the decedent's estates is not binding on the decedent's other estates or
representatives." Wisemantle v. Hull Enters., 103 I11.App. 3d 878, 881-82, 432 N.E.2d 613, 616
(1981) (citation omitted).
155. Unif. Probate Court § 4-401, 8 U.L.A. 427 (1983).
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-303 (1955) (repealed 1959). The statute provided that, "[t]he
courts of Kansas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the devolution of property by will
or descent of all persons who are residents of Kansas at the time of death as to real property
located in Kansas and tangible or intangible personal property wherever located." Id.
157. 181 Kan. 729, 315 P.2d 611 (1957).
158. Id. at 742, 315 P.2d at 621.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 731, 315 P.2d at 613-14.
161. Id. at 731-32, 315 P.2d at 614.
162. Id. at 752, 315 P.2d at 628.
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clusive jurisdiction, but it has held that the power of a receiver of an
insolvent corporation must be recognized by other states."' There is no
164
reason to treat the representative of a deceased person differently.
The UPC has alleviated some of the problems surrounding enforcement of judgments in probate proceedings by allowing a foreign
personal representative to act, so long as no domiciliary personal representative has been appointed, by filing a copy of his appointment with
the appropriate court. 6 ' The UPC also gives the domiciliary personal
representative priority for appointment as the ancillary personal representative.166 Additionally, the UPC makes the foreign personal representative subject to the jurisdiction of the court "to the same extent
that his decedent was subject to jurisdiction immediately prior to
death."1 67 Finally, the UPC makes an adjudication against any personal representative in any jurisdiction binding on the local personal
1 68
representative as if he were a party to the adjudication."
C. Uncertain Areas
The law is unsettled on the enforceability in a foreign court of
modifiable decrees, custody decrees, injunctions against foreign suits,
and penalty judgments, and on the collateral estoppel effects of judgments. The. current status of these issues is discussed in this section.
1. Modifiable Decrees
Neither the full faith and credit clause nor its implementing statute says anything about finality, but there is a general understanding
that only a final judgment or decree is entitled to full faith and
credit.170 The courts generally have found that judgments subject to
modification in the state of rendition are not entitled to full faith and
72
credit. 71 The Supreme Court has not decided this precise question,1
69

163. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912).
164. See Currie, The Multiple Personality Of the Dead: Executors, Administrators, and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. CHI. L REv. 429, 435-38 (1966).
165. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 4-204 to -206, 8 U.L.A. 422-24 (1983).
166. Id. § 3-203, 8 U.L.A. 239.
167. Id. § 4-302, 8 U.L.A. 426.
168. Id. § 4-401, 8 U.L.A. 427.
169. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1987).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (1971).
171. Id. § 109 comment c.
172. But see Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944). The concurring opinion states:
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the Act of Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments or, for that matter, about any judgments.
Both require that full faith and credit be given to "judicial proceedings" without limitation
as to finality. Upon recognition of the broad. meaning of that term much may some day
depend.
Id. at 87 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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but it has held that, if a modifiable decree is enforced in another state,
the defendant must be given the same opportunity to seek modification
that would have existed in the rendering state.173
The state courts have handled the issue of the modifiable decree in
varying ways. Some have refused enforcement.17 The California Supreme Court set the example for discretionary enforcement in Worthley v. Worthley1 7 8 In Worthley, the court enforced a New Jersey sup7
port decree that was both retroactively and prospectively modifiable.1
It held that while the full faith and credit clause did not require enforcement, the decree should be enforced in California when it was a
more convenient forum than the rendering state. 17 7 It remanded the
case for a trial on the issue of modification and stated that either party
could litigate that issue.
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Light v. Light,1 78 held
that a Missouri support order was entitled to full faith and credit.
Policy considerations argue strongly that such decrees are entitled to
full faith and credit ...
Strong as are the considerations of policy, the argument that derives
from the language of the constitution itself is at least as strong ...
The practical problems that might arise in the enforcement of a decree subject to modification by the courts of more than one forum are no
more difficult under the full-faith-and-credit clause than they are when
foreign judgments are given full effect as a matter of comity. 179
2.

Custody

The United States Supreme Court has never decided squarely
whether a custody decree is entitled to full faith and credit. In Halvey
v. Halvey,180 the Court held that the forum has at least as much leeway
as the rendering state to modify a modifiable custody decree. In May v.
Anderson, s1 the Court held that a custody decree rendered without
personal jurisdiction over one parent could not be binding on that parent and the state where that parent is located is not required to give
173. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 232-34 (1946).
174. E.g., Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85, 75 N.E. 92 (1905); Catlett v. Catlett, 412 P.2d 942
(Okla. 1966).
175. 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
176. Id. at 474, 238 P.2d at 25.
177. Id. at 473-74, 283 P.2d at 24-25.
178. 12 I1. 2d 502, 147-N.E.2d 34 .(1957).
179. Id. at 510-11, 147 N.E.2d at 39-40.
180. 330 U.S. 610 (1947); see also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (full faith and credit
not applicable to judgments which are not res judicata); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958)
(dealing with the effects of changed circumstances).
181. 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (plurality opinion).
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full faith and credit to the decree. "
State courts differ as to whether a custody decree is entitled to full
faith and credit when the court lacks jurisdiction over one of the parents. Most are inclined to grant full faith and credit, subject to the
right to modify the decree upon a showing of changed circumstances."'
However, in looking for changed circumstances, the courts frequently
8
reexamine the merits of the original decree.'" In Borys v. Borys,1 5 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey denied full faith and credit to a Florida
decree on the grounds that "[c]ustody judgments are inherently ephemeral decisions about continuing relationships which are subject to constantly changing conditions,"18 and that "local interests outweighed
87 The court emphathe need for uniform treatment of the decree."''
sized, however, that it could choose to recognize the decree to protect
the child's interests, and that it could decline jurisdiction. 188 The latter
would be appropriate when the child is present in the forum as a result
of child snatching or disobedience of the custody order of a sister
state. " The Borys court was willing to undertake a new inquiry because the children had been in New Jersey for three years and the
disruptive potential of removing them was patent. e00
The problem with the Borys result is that the status of the child
remains unsettled because the dissatisfied parent has a good chance of
getting a different result by taking the child to another state and bringing an action there. With increased public awareness of child snatching, and the understanding that a parent who is before the court can be
more persuasive than the absent parent, some courts began to give a
greater full faith and credit effect to custody decrees. In Ferreira v.
Ferreira,' the Supreme Court of California held that it would give
full faith and credit to an Idaho decree granting custody to the mother.
182. Because the case went to the Court on the holding of the Ohio court that full faith and
credit was required, the direct holding was that it was not. However, the language of the plurality
opinion indicates that due process would prevent enforcement of the decree even by comity because the rendering court had no jurisdiction over the mother. Id. at 533-34. Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence, necessary to make the majority, is based solely on lack of a requirement of full faith
and credit. Id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Therefore, the question of enforcement by
comity is left open. The dissent argued that the jurisdictional question was not raised on the
record. Id. at 542 (Minton, J., dissenting).
183. See Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees, 73 YALE
L.J. 134, 143-44 (1963).
184. Id. at 143.
185. 76 N.J. 103, 386 A.2d 372 (1978) (per curiam).
186. Id. at 124, 386 A.2d at 376.
187. Id. at 123-24, 386 A.2d at 376.
188. Id. at 124-25, 386 A.2d at 377.
189. Id. at 125, 386 A.2d at 377.
190. Id. at 126-27, 386 A.2d at 378.
191. 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
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The father who had the child in California had no standing to seek
modification except where there was an allegation and proof that enforcing the original decree would endanger the health and safety of the
child.' 9" Because such an allegation was made, the court granted the
petitioning parent temporary custody, and ordered a stay of the forum
proceeding to give the rendering state an opportunity to consider modification. The court also retained jurisdiction until the modification proceeding was complete. 193
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),'" now
enacted in all states and the District of Columbia, 195 is designed to give
one state full responsibility for the custody of a child. 1 " The UCCJA
sets out factors to be used to determine which state has jurisdiction and
requires other states to defer to that state.1 97 The UCCJA also provides
for changes in jurisdiction if the original state no longer has appreciable ties with the child and the family. 8 The purpose of the UCCJA is
to confer decision-making responsibility in the court that has the most
information about the situation of the child and the parents. 99
It is not clear that the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA
meet the constitutional requirements of the full faith and credit clause
as set forth in May v. Anderson. 00° The UCCJA, by allowing jurisdic-

tion in a state where only one parent is located 2 °0 does not meet the
standard of the plurality opinion in May, which stated that the rendering state cannot bind a parent who personally is not before it. 2
Congress, exercising its power under the full faith and credit
clause, has made the jurisdictional and substantive provisions of the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA) the standard for recognition of foreign custody orders.20 3 The statute provides:
The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to
its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of
this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the
192.

Id. at 842, 512 P.2d at 316, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 92.

193.

Id. at 843, 512 P.2d at 317, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 93; see also In re Marriage of Saucido,

538 P.2d 1219 (Wash. 1975) (using unclean hands doctrine to deny jurisdiction to a parent who
had brought the child to Washington in violation of a guardianship order of Arizona).
194. 9 pt. 1 U.L.A. 115 (1968).
195. Id. at §§ 115-16.
196. Id. § 1, at 123-24.
197. Id. § 3, at 143-44.
198.

Id.

199. Id. § 1, at 123-24.
200. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
201. 9 U.L.A. at § 143.
202. 345 U.S. at 534.
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
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provisions of this section by a court of another State. 0 '
The phrase, "provisions of this section," refers to the provisions of the
PKPA, but strong preference is given to the home state of the child by
only when
allowing jurisdiction based on the best interest of the child
2 05
child.
the
of
state
home
the
as
jurisdiction
has
state
no
IThe United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson2"
deterheld that the PKPA does not provide a federal cause of action to
20 7
This
mine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.
holding is consistent with evolving full faith and credit principles, and
seems to be workable.
Whether the promulgation of the PKPA will solve the problem of
enforcement of child custody orders is doubtful. Responsibility for child
custody, if retained in a single state, could reduce problems substantially, but the issue of jurisdiction over an absent parent raised in May
cannot be resolved by statute. It might be argued that the PKPA, enacted under the enabling power of the full faith and credit clause,
trumps the due process clause as a result of the compelling need to
have a single state with exclusive jurisdiction. In spite of any judicial
resolution of this issue, the emotion inherent in custody cases will continue to result in renewed efforts at custody by dissatisfied parents.
3. Injunction of Foreign Suit
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may bind
by injunction of suit in another state,2 08 but it has not departies
the
cided the effect of such an injunction when the foreign suit proceeds to
judgment. As a result, some state courts have held that an injunction is
not entitled to full faith and credit.'

James v. Grand Trunk Western

is an example of the extreme result that follows from such
A
a holding. Michigan plaintiff who sued the railroad in Illinois for an
accident that occurred in Michigan was enjoined by a Michigan court
from proceeding with the Illinois action.211 The Illinois court not only
refused to respect the injunction, but issued a counter injunction ordering the defendant not to seek enforcement of the Michigan injunction.' 1 ' Affirmance by the Supreme Court of Illinois may have reflected
Railroads10

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. § 1738A(a).
Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D)(i).
484 U.S. 174 (1988).
Id. at 187.
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 134 (1890).
Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 823-24.
14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958).
Id. at 358, 152 N.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 372, 152 N.E.2d at 867.
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disapproval of the defendant's use of the extraordinary remedy of in-

junction rather than the ordinary one of moving to dismiss on the
ground of inconvenient forum. Secondly, the court's ruling may have
reflected the belief that seeking extraordinary relief expressed a lack of

respect for the right of Illinois courts to determine their own
3
21

jurisdiction.
The effect of a judgment obtained in violation of a foreign injunction also is uncertain. In Joffe v. Joffe,2 a New Jersey superior court
enjoined a wife from pursuing a New York separation action. New
Jersey was the marital domicile; the wife and child were living in New
York while the husband was still in New Jersey.2 15 The wife ignored
the injunction and continued the New York action. 21 The husband was
held to have made a general appearance by the New York court which
granted the wife's request for separation, child custody, and support for
herself and the child.21 7 The New Jersey Superior Court found the wife
guilty of contempt; its decision was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.2 1 In the meantime, the wife had obtained two support
arrears adjudications from New York and sought to collect them in the
federal district court in New Jersey, which stayed the proceeding pending decision of the contempt case.21 ' The wife's appeal of the stay was
before the federal court of appeals when the New Jersey court held the
stay proper. 220 The New Jersey court, while not openly denying full
faith and credit to the New York judgment, produced that effect because the wife would be in contempt every time she tried to enforce an
2 21
arrears judgment.
An Illinois court, in Keck v. Kecko
reached a different conclusion on the effect of a judgment obtained in violation of a foreign injunction. In Keck, a husband filed a divorce action in Illinois. 28 When
his wife counter-claimed for separate maintenance, he moved to Nevada where soon after he filed a divorce action .2 The Illinois court
enjoined his proceeding with the Nevada action, but he ignored the

213. Id. at 371, 152 N.E.2d at 862.
214. 50 N.J. 265, 234 A.2d 232 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
215. Id. at 267, 234 A.2d at 233.
216. Id. at 266, 234 A.2d at 232.
217. Id. at 266, 234 A.2d at 233.
218. Id. at 267, 234 A.2d at 237.
219. Joffe v. Joffe, 384 F.2d 632, 633 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
220. Id.
221. See Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 827.
222. 8 Il1. App. 3d 277, 290 N.E.2d 385 (1972).
223. Id. at 278, 290 N.E.2d at 387.
224. Id. at 279, 290 N.E.2d at 387.
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injunction and ultimately obtained a divorce. 2 He then filed a motion
to dismiss the Illinois action on the ground that the marriage had been
dissolved. The Illinois court denied the motion, holding that his divorce
26
decree was invalid because he violated the injunction.S An Illinois appellate court reversed, holding that the injunction operated on the huscourt whose decision, therefore, was entitled
band, not on the Nevada
227
credit.
to full faith and
Ginsburg would appear to argue that the nonsuit injunction should
228
be given full faith and credit by the court whose action was enjoined.
This position seems to be consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit clause, and with the
language of the clause and its implementing statute. A decision by a
court with the parties before it is a proper forum for litigation. Foreign
courts should recognize the nonsuit injunction for what it is-an order
to a party which is not intended to, and does not, interfere with another
court's jurisdiction except as it decides rights between the parties. If
the injunction is not recognized, however, the Keck result seems preferable to that of Joffe. Regardless of the circumstances under which it is
obtained, the nonsuit injunction is a final judgment squarely within the
mandate of the Supreme Court.
4.

Tax Judgments and Penalties
"The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another
"229

This statement, made in a case deciding that slaves taken in

the capture of a pirate ship must be returned to their owner, has been
lifted out of context to support holdings asserting that a state need not
enforce another Istate's penal laws.230 The concept has been extended
further to include tax laws.2"' The United States Supreme Court, in
23 2
has indicated that penal judgWisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co.,
233
ments need not be enforced. The holding, however, was based upon
the Court's lack of original jurisdiction to enforce a penalty imposed by
Wisconsin on a Louisiana insurer that did not comply with Wisconsin
Id.
Id. at 280, 290 N.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 282, 290 N.E.2d at 390.
Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 828; see also Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign
Injunctions, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1959).
229. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, J.).
230. See Comment, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 195 (1932).
231. Id. at 215-19.
232. 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
233. Id. at 289-90.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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requirements. 234 In Huntington v. Atrill,28 5 the Court narrowed the
definition of a penal claim, enabling it to enforce what otherwise would
have been a penal judgment.2 3 6 The Court avoided any declaration that
the judgment would be unenforceable if penal.
The Supreme Court, in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,23
holding that a judgment for taxes is entitled to full faith and credit,
stated: "[A] judgment is not to be denied full faith and credit . . .
merely because it is for taxes. 2 3' Although the logic of Milwaukee
County could be extended to judgments based on penal claims, later
decisions do not adopt this approach. As a result, the older cases still
may provide support for denying enforcement of penal claims.
A series of New Jersey cases sheds considerable light on the problem of enforcement of penal claims.2 3 In City of Philadelphia v.
Smith, " the New Jersey Supreme Court enforcing a tax judgment,
held that the portion of a tax judgment imposing a civil penalty of one
percent per month for unpaid taxes was not punishment, but, rather,
compensation for the expense of collecting unpaid taxes. In City of
Philadelphia v. Austin,2 4 1 the same court held that a judgment for a
$300 fine levied for non-payment of taxes is enforceable. The court apparently was influenced by the reduction of the penal claim to a judgment.24" This significant change in status was said to have enhanced
enforceability under the full faith and credit clause but was not the
only reason for granting enforcement. The court said, "[a]lthough the
reduction of the claim to a judgment might be sufficient by itself to
remove the barrier of the penal exception, other reasons support enforcement of the judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 2 3
The court was influenced by the role of the penalty in a tax law
designed to collect revenues and reasoned that the penalty may be necessary to compensate for collection costs. 2 " The purpose of the penalty,

234. Id. at 299-300.
235. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
236. Id. at 683-84.
237. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
238. Id. at 279.
239. The cases arose from a common scenario. Many New Jersey residents worked in Philadelphia for the federal government. These workers were subject to the Philadelphia Wage and Net
Profits Tax Ordinance but failed to pay taxes due under it. The federal government withheld no
wage taxes. The City of Philadelphia brought suits in Pennsylvania seeking payment of taxes and
interest thereon. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Smith, 82 N.J. 429, 413 A.2d 952 (1980).
240. Id.
241. 86 N.J. 55, 429 A.2d 568 (1981). For a good discussion of the history of the penal
judgment problem, see id. at 58-60, 429 A.2d at 569-70.
242. Id. at 63, 429 A.2d at 572.
243. Id. at 62, 429 A.2d at 571.
244. Id.
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said the court, is not to punish, "but to grant a civil remedy to the City
in its role as tax collector." 2 45 The New Jersey Supreme Court found it
2
unnecessary and inappropriate " to reject outright the penal exception
in light of its recent reaffirmation by the United States Supreme
Court.2 47 The New Jersey court stated that, in the alternative, the penalty judgment could be enforced under principles of comity."
Finally, in City of Philadelphia v. Bauer,2' the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with a legislative response to its earlier holdings.
The statute in question provided that no judgment obtained for any
employment wage tax, including penalties, may be enforced by sale of
realty.2 50 The court declared this statute invalid on the grounds that it
violated the full faith and credit clause and said: "[A] state must accord full faith and credit to a judgment of a sister state. This is so even
if the underlying cause of action in the original judgment would not
necessarily be a valid cause of action in the state providing the forum
for enforcement. ' 251 The court emphasized that the cause of action had
merged into the judgment, which, as an obligation to pay money, is as
enforceable as any debt."2" The court reasoned that the statute would
be applicable only by going behind the judgment, thus violating the
2 58
purpose of the full faith and credit clause. The court recognized that
local law may determine the scope and nature of available remedies,
but found that application of the statute would deny the only available
remedy.254 It also found, based upon legislative history and on the fact
that no New Jersey government has a wage tax, that the statute was
2 5
directed specifically at the Philadelphia tax. The court said that "[a]
state may not by subterfuge refuse to give full faith and credit to the
judgment of a sister state." 256
The court's language, if taken literally, would mean that it is
245. Id.
246. Id. at 63, 429 A.2d at 572.
247. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970). A concurring opinion in Austin argued
that Nelson is inapplicable as it applies to a criminal order, not a civil penalty. 85 N.J. at 67, 429
A.2d at 574 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
248. 85 N.J. at 63-64, 429 A.2d at 572-73.
249. 97 N.J. 372, 478 A.2d 773 (1984).
250. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:17-17 (1987).
251. 97 N.J. at 377, 478 A.2d at 776.
252. Id. at 377-78, 478 A.2d at 776.
253. Id. at 379, 478 A.2d at 777.
254. Id. at 381, 478 A.2d at 778.
255. Id. at 380, 478 A.2d at 777.
256. Id.; see also Boyer v. Korsunsky, Frank, Erickson Architects, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 549,
550, 382 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1989). The court enforceda Michigan consent judgment that provided
for monthly payments and rejected the argument that the 12 percent statutory interest was a
penalty and against Georgia public policy stating that, the full faith and credit clause controls
even if it is a penalty.
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ready to reject the penal exception entirely, since rejecting any judgment on the basis of penalty would require going behind the judgment.
New Jersey's position is correct, as neither the full faith and credit
clause nor its enabling statute excepts penal judgments.
5. Claim Preclusion
Whether a judgment should be given greater effect than it has in
the state where rendered was the issue before the New York court in
Hart v. American Airlines.2" 7 Several actions arose out of a plane crash

in Kentucky. 8 The first case to reach judgment, filed in Texas, resulted in a plaintiff's 'ictory.2 59 New York plaintiffs then asked that the
cases pending in New York be confined to the issue of damages, and
that the Texas finding of negligence be applied upon a theory of collateral estoppel. 6° The New York court applied collateral estoppel, holding that the policies of limiting a party to one day in court and preventing inconsistent results are applicable to both foreign and domestic
decisions.26 1 The court's application of collateral estoppel is sensible.
Giving the Texas judgment greater preclusive effect is consistent with
the policy of respect for the rendering state, " ' and with the policy of
putting an end to litigation.
The United States Supreme Court tacitly approved the American

Airlines result in Allen v. McCurry.2 3 The issue in Allen was whether

a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action brought against police officers for
unconstitutional search and seizure was bound by a state court exclusionary hearing finding that the search was not illegal. " 4 The Supreme
257. 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
258. Id. at 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
259. American Airlines v. U.S., 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
260. 61 Misc. 2d at 42, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 811. Texas followed the historical rule that estoppci must be mutual. Under this rule collateral estoppel would be inapplicable because the New
York plaintiffs could not be bound by the Texas action. New York, however, follows the modern
rule of collateral estoppel which allows a nonparty in the prior action to estop a party in the prior.
action from relitigating any issue decided in the prior action when two requirements are met: (1)
the issue must have been necessary to the prior decision, and (2) the party to be bound by estoppel
must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Id. at 43, 304
N.Y.S. at 812; cf. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L.
REV. 301 (1961) (supporting the retention of mutuality except in certain limited areas).
261. Hart, 61 Misc. 2d at 46, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 815. An earlier motion by a different plaintiff had been denied and the denial affirmed by the appellate division. 31 A.D.2d 896, 297
N.Y.S.2d 587 (1969). The Hart court distinguished that holding on the ground that the plaintiff
was a nonresident of New York while the present plaintiffs were residents. 61 Misc. 2d at 43-44,
304 N.Y.S.2d at 813. This may be a rational basis for distinction under the full faith and credit
clause, but it raises a problem of discrimination under the article IV privileges and immunities
clause.
262. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 326-27 (1978).
263. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
264. Id. at 91.
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Court determined that federal collateral estoppel rules were applicable
and that the plaintiff was indeed bound." 5 It is noteworthy that the
Court did not address the question of whether application of the state
rules would collaterally estop the plaintiff. The omission indicates that
the Court did not find the question important.
III.

PURPOSE OF THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

Evaluation of the reach of the full faith and credit clause depends
on understanding its purpose. Three workers' compensation cases shed
light on the issue of purpose and suggest that the clause is intended to
achieve unification of the states on a national level.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt "6 concerned the preclusive effect of a Texas workers' compensation award on an employee's right 6to7
compensation under the Louisiana workers' compensation statute.
The plaintiff, employed in Louisiana, was injured while working in
Texas for the same employer.26 8 After receiving a compensation award
in Texas that became final according to the Texas statute, the plaintiff
then brought an action in a Louisiana district court seeking compensation for his injury under Louisiana law. " 9
The United States Supreme Court held that the Texas award was
final and entitled to full faith and credit, thus precluding an additional
Louisiana award. 70 The Court assumed that there might be "exceptional cases in which the judgment of one state would not override the
laws and policy of another," but found no such exception in the case of
a money judgment.2 7 1 The Court indicated that future exceptions are a
remote possibility:
These consequences flow from the clear purpose of the full faith and
credit clause to establish throughout the federal system the salutary
principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment
shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as
in that where the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action
merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every other. The
full faith and credit clause like the commerce clause thus became a nationally unifying force. It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations
created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the
others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 105.
320 U.S. 430 (1943).
Id. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 438.
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rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. Because there is a full faith and credit clause a defendant may not
a second time challenge the validity of the plaintiff's right which has
ripened into a judgment and a plaintiff may not for his single cause of
action secure a second or a greater recovery.""
Four justices dissented. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Murphy, argued that the Texas award did not purport to adjudicate the
rights of the employee under Louisiana law and was not res judicata as
to that law.27 8 Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge, additionally found it significant that the proceeding in Texas
was against the insurer only and the award was limited to a release of
the insurer from further liability.2 74 The employer's liability was not in
issue. 5
IndustrialCommission v. McCartin2 7 6 reached the Supreme Court
four years after Magnolia Petroleum. The case involved an Illinois employee of an Illinois employer injured while working in Wisconsin. In
order to avoid the expense and delay of litigation, the employer and
employee entered into a settlement contract which fixed compensation
at the amount to which the employee was entitled under the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The settlement agreement became,
in legal effect, an award after it was approved by one of the commissioners of the Illinois Industrial Commission. 7 8 One of the stated provisions of the agreement stipulated: "[t]his settlement does not affect any
rights that applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the State of Wisconsin. '2 7 9 The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could grant a supplemental award because the Illinois award
was not intended to be final and conclusive of all the employee's
rights.2 8 0
The Supreme Court in McCartin distinguished Magnolia Petroleum by noting that there was nothing in the Illinois statute to indicate
that it was exclusive and would preclude any recovery proceedings
brought in a different state during the course of employment in Illinois.2 81 The Court also based its decision on the fact that the settlement
agreement stated that the agreement did not affect the employee's

272. Id. at 439-40 (citations omitted).
273. Id. at 447-51 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
274. Id. at 453 (Black, J. dissenting).
275.

Id.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

330 U.S. 622 (1947).
Id. at 624.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 630.
Id.
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rights under Wisconsin law.2 82 The Court did not cite the Texas statute, which provides that employees "shall have no right of action
against their employer or against any agent, servant or employ6e of
said employer for damages for personal injuries . . . but such employ6es . . . shall look for compensation solely to the association [the insurer]." 8 In a comparable vein, the Illinois statute provides: "'No
common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death
sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such
employee, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this act
""
The statutes do not appear to be distinguishable.
The Supreme Court in McCartin lost sight of the concept of the
full faith and credit clause as a nationalizing provision. If the clause
truly is to nationalize judgments, the Court's inquiry should have been
into the res judicata effect of the Illinois award, not the effect on other
states that was intended by Illinois. An award final in Illinois should be
final in all states. The Court's suggestion that the award was not really
final may be the basis for finding it was res judicata only as to rights in
Illinois. The Court's emphasis on the effect intended by Illinois, however, clearly undermines the unifying purpose of the full faith and
credit clause.
85
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.' further confuses the issue. A District of Columbia employee of a District of Columbia employer was injured in Virginia and received a workers' compensation
award in Virginia.' 6 The employee then applied for and received a
87
supplemental award in the District of Columbia.2 The Supreme Court
"
upheld the supplemental award in a decision lacking a majority. The
multiplicity of opinions in Thomas reflects considerable confusion
about the purpose of the full faith and credit clause.
The plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun, discussed Magnolia Petroleum
and McCartin.'8 9 Justice Stevens noted the discrepancy in the two

282. Id. at 627-28.
283. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 435 (1943) (quoting TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967)).
284. 330 U.S. at 627 (quoting Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act § 6, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, para. 138-72 (1943)). The Texas statute, more than its Illinois counterpart, seems directed
to exclusivity of worker's compensation over common law rather than to exclusivity over another
state's workers' compensation law.
285. 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (plurality opinion).
286. Id. at 263-64.
287. Id. at 265-66.
288. Id. at 265.
289. Id. at 267-69.
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holdings. Under Magnolia Petroleum, a state may determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments only indirectly, by prescribing the effects within the state. 90 Under McCartin, on the other hand, a state
may, by drafting or construing its legislation in "unmistakable language," directly determine the extraterritorial effects of its judgments."" 1 McCartin's reference to "unmistakable language," according
to Justice Stevens:
represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this Court's responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and credit questions. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause "is one of the provisions incorporated into
the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation." To vest the power
of determining the extraterritorial effect of a State's own laws and judgments in the State itself risks the very kind of parochial entrenchment on
the interests of other States that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause
and other provisions of Art. IV of the Constitution to
292
prevent.
Justice Stevens concluded that Magnolia Petroleum should be overruled because it effected a dramatic change in previous practices.29 3 He
noted also that most courts followed McCartin, so the values underlying stare decisis would be disserved by attempting to revive Magnolia
Petroleum or to preserve the uneasy coexistence of the two holdings.29"
Justice Stevens then considered the interests of the states in question and noted that while Virginia had a valid interest in limiting potential liability of companies that transact business within its borders,
both states had a valid interest in the welfare of the employee. Additionally, Virginia was said to have an interest in having its formal determinations of contested issues respected by other sovereigns.2 95 Justice Stevens determined, however, that because the claim originally
could have been made in either state, Virginia's interest in limiting employer liability was not of controlling importance. 96 The interest of
both states in the welfare of the employee would be served by allowing

290. Id. at 270.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 271-72 (footnote omitted) (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 331 U.S. 343, 355
(1947)).
293. Id. at 273-74.
294. Id. at 273-77.
295. Id. at 277. As the dissent recognizes, limiting employer liability and ensuring employee
welfare are interests justifying a choice of law, not a refusal to recognize a judgment. Id. at 29293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The cases cited by the Court in support of its opinion are choice-oflaw cases. Id. at 277-79.
296. Id. at 279-80.
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the higher award.2 97 The key issue, therefore, was "whether Virginia's
interest in the integrity of its tribunal's determinations foreclose[d] a
second proceeding."2 9
Justice Stevens answered that question in the negative, concluding
that Virginia's interest was not controlling due to the nature of the
proceedings.2 99 The Commission that made the award determined the
employee's rights under the Virginia statute, but it could not, and did
not purport to, determine his rights under any other statute.3 00 Since
full faith and credit cannot be given to a determination that the Commission had no power to make, the District of Columbia was free to
determine the employee's rights under its own law. 301
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell,
wrote a concurring opinion expressing concern about the scope of the
plurality's rationale and fear that it would extend to other kinds of actions.3 2 Although the plurality opinion could by its facts be limited to
administrative decisions, Justice White presumed that the holding
would apply also to an appeal of an administrative decision, thus extending the holding to court actions. 303
Justice White's concurrence is noteworthy in the clarity of its discussion of the full faith and credit clause. He stated:
The plurality criticizes the McCartin case for vesting in the State the
power to determine the extraterritorial effect of its own laws and judgments, yet it seems that its opinion is subject to the same objection .
One purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to bring an end

297. Id. at 280.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 283.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 282-83.
302. Id. at 286-87 (White, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 286. Of course, the appeal would be on the basis of what the agency had the
power to decide. The court on appeal would have no more power to choose another state's law
than the agency did. Justice White also saw no difference between a statute that states a forumfavoring choice-of-law rule and a common-law doctrine doing the same thing. Again, the question
is one of power. The statutory choice-of-law rule is no different from the common-law rule, but
that is not what the Court had before it. The statute creating the Virginia Industrial Commission
did not give it power to administer any other state's law. If it found Virginia law applicable it was
required to use Virginia law regardless of whether any other state's law also might be applicable.
If it found Virginia law inapplicable it had no power to hear the case. That is different from a
court, which does have power to choose law. Id. The difference is not really between an administrative agency and a court; Magnolia Petroleum found the agency award entitled to full faith and
credit, 320 U.S. at 443, as recognized by the plurality in Thomas. 448 U.S. at 281. The difference
is power. A state could limit its courts to hearing only cases arising under that state's law, and the
courts would then have no more power to make a choice of law than the agency had here. See
Sterk, Full Faith and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments, 69 GEO. L.J. 1329, 1351-59 (1981).
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to litigation..

..

The plurality's opinion is at odds with this principle of

finality ...
Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to
act as a nationally unifying force. 804

Justice Rehnquist's dissent described Thomas well:
In choosing between two admittedly inconsistent precedents, six of us
agree that the latter decision, McCartin, is analytically indefensible. The
remaining three Members of the Court concede that it "rest[s] on questionable foundations." Nevertheless, when the smoke clears, it is Magnolia rather than McCartin that the plurality suggests should be
overruled. 0 5
He also criticized the plurality for underrating Virginia's interest in
finality of its adjudications, 8°0 and argued that if adjudications are not
final, Virginia's efforts and expense are wasted when the employee obtains a duplicative remedy in another state. 0 Both the Commonwealth
of Virginia and the employer had expended resources for the benefit of
the petitioner.30 8 Seeing that these expenditures are not wasted lies at
the heart of differences in constitutional treatment between judgments
and statutes.8 0 9 Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on the interest of Virginia
in having its judgment enforced indicates that he and those who join
with him have not fully recognized the nationalizing purpose of the full
faith and credit clause. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the employee voluntarily chose to claim in Virginia and should be bound by
the Virginia result. Any overreaching or coercion, he stated, can be
dealt with by allowing vacation of the award:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause did not allot to this Court the
task of "balancing" interests where the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of a State were involved. It simply directed that they
be given the "Full Faith and Credit" that the Court today denies to
those of Virginia. 10

304. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 287-89 (White, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). In spite of his
understanding of the purpose of the full faith and credit clause, Justice White would not overrule
either Magnolia Petroleum or McCartin. He finds Magnolia Petroleum of greater soundness, but

accepts McCartin because it has been widely interpreted as limiting Magnolia Petroleum. Further, the decision in McCartin is not applicable outside the workers' compensation area. Justice
White agrees that McCartin controlled the result in Thomas because the Virginia statute lacks
the "unmistakable language" required by McCartin. Id. at 288-90.
305. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 289 (White, J.,
concurring)).
306. Id. at 293.
307. Id.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 296.
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It is unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court in Thomas
failed to take advantage of an opportunity to reaffirm the principle of
nationalizing res judicata and to reconcile Magnolia Petroleum and
McCartin. Magnolia Petroleum stated and applied the nationalizing
principle."' McCartin recognized that workers' compensation cases
might be different,"'. but did not articulate that difference well. The
plurality in Thomas saw the difference, but did not recognize its significance. Workers' compensation claims are administered by a board that
does not have power to make a choice of law. Additionally, a workers'
compensation award does not purport to be full compensation for injury. These principles mean that full faith and credit can be given to
the determination of the claimant's rights under the law of one state
while allowing another state to make a supplemental award. The Commission's decision in Thomas did not purport to determine anything
more than the employee's rights under the law it administered, and did
not purport to grant a conclusive award. As a result, the second state,
by making a supplemental award, is not denying full faith and credit to
the Commission's judgment. The strongest reason for recognizing the
distinction is set forth by the plurality:
Compensation proceedings are often initiated informally, without the advice of counsel, and without special attention to the choice of the most
appropriate forum. Often the worker is still hospitalized when benefits
indeed, it is not always the
are sought as was true in this case. And
31 8
claim.
the
institutes
who
injured worker
The concurring opinion in Thomas expressed concern that the plurality's reasoning could be extended to enable a plaintiff in an ordinary
tort action to obtain judgments in two states. This concern is unrealistic
because the plurality emphasized that "the critical difference between a
court of general jurisdiction and an administrative agency with limited
statutory authority forecloses the conclusion that constitutional rules
applicable to court judgments are necessarily applicable to workmen's
compensation awards. 3 1 4 A judgment of damages in a tort suit be311.
312.

320 U.S. at 438.
330 U.S. at 630.

313. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 284. Justice Rehnquist rejected this reason. Id. at 293-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, it was a factor in Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Magnolia

Petroleum, 320 U.S. at 454 (Black, J.,dissenting), see also R. WEINTRAUa, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 9.3A, at 554-55 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting that the award does not purport
to be full compensation-the worker's choice of forum is likely to be uninformed and the second
award is supplemental, not duplicative); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 171-77 (1949) (arguing that the inability of the worker to
raise the choice-of-law question and the strong interest of the second state justify a supplemental
award).
314. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281-82.
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tween adversary parties is a "true" judgment in that it is a precise
determination of the value of harm suffered and a final determination
of the parties' rights.
The Supreme Court today is different from the Court sitting at the
time of Thomas, and the reach which might be accorded to the full
faith and credit clause by today's Court is unknown. 1 5 One can be
hopeful, however, that the serious problem reflected in the Court's previous discussions of the full faith and credit clause-the lack of a clear
conceptualization of its purpose and reach-will be rectified in the
future.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An understanding of the purpose of the full faith and credit clause
is crucial to making sense of decisions in the problem areas addressed
in this article. If the purpose of the clause is deference to the rendering
state, then it is acceptable to make exceptions where the interest of the
enforcing state outweighs the need for deference. If, on the other hand,
the purpose is to nationalize fifty states for res judicata purposes, no
exception is proper except in matters involving title to land, where the
question is jurisdiction of the rendering court rather than recognition of
the judgment. The history of full faith and credit litigation supports
nationalization as the primary purpose:
Public policy .
dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those
who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest;
and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between
the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every
case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard,
and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded
by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.8 18
The needs of the nation also support nationalization as a primary purpose. If judgments do not have finality nationwide, parties are encouraged to litigate in every state having jurisdiction, producing greater
overcrowding in already overcrowded courts."
The history of full faith and credit litigation also suggests that the
primary purpose of the clause is putting an end to litigation. A fair
opportunity to litigate an issue is sufficient to bind the litigant to the
result in the state rendering the judgment or decree and in any state

315. Four justices-Stewart and Brennan from the plurality and Burger and Powell from
the concurrence-are no longer on the Court. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter
have not written on the issue of the full faith and credit clause.
316. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1963) (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931).
317. See Sterk, supra note 303, at 1345.
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enforcing it. A modifiable decree could be modified in another state,
but any modification would be based upon the validity of the decree as
rendered.
Not all of the problems discussed in this comment fit neatly into
res judicata analysis. Barring enforcement of a judgment as a result of
application of the forum's statute of limitations may put an end to litigation, but not in the way contemplated by the full faith and credit
clause because it does not give the judgment the same faith and credit
it would have in the state where rendered. That, of course, is the other
side of the clause. A person who obtains relief should not find it denied
to him or her because the judgment must be enforced in another state.
The relationship between the full faith and credit clause and collateral
estoppel is not so clear. Creating a collateral estoppel effect for a judgment that would not have the effect in the rendering state plainly is not
to give the same faith and credit as would be given in the rendering
state. The result, nevertheless, is an end to litigation.
Recognition of the purpose of the full faith and credit clause also
enhances the position of those who urge enforceability of foreign judgments affecting title to land. Even though the United States Supreme
Court has held that jurisdiction lies only in the situs of the land, there
seems to be no good reason to allow a person two opportunities to litigate a question of title to land unless something in the suit affects a
real interest of the situs state. Normally, a state has no concern with
who owns land. Its interests in the land are fully protected by regulation of land use and by procedures for protecting title.
Enforcement also should be required in probate proceedings. A
personal representative should have the same powers and disabilities as
the decedent-no more and no fewer. Any judgment or decree meeting
the requirement of fair opportunity to litigate should be enforceable by
or against the estate.
In short, the full faith and credit clause should be interpreted to
make one nation of fifty states for the purpose of finality of judgments.
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